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Introduction 
The thrust of defendant Allstate Insurance Company's 
(••Allstate") Brief is that Utah's No-Fault Act (the "Act") is designed 
to provide a "quick, definite, but limited source of funds" and that 
the interpretation of the Act urged by plaintiff Kenneth W. Larsen 
("Larsen") is contrary to that design. In attempting to advance this 
argument, Allstate disingenuously charges Larsen with attempting to 
expand benefits provided by the Act and incorrectly characterizes 
Larsen as attempting to obtain the 52 weeks of benefits provided for 
under the Act from a time "when benefits are first requested." 
Larsen does not seek to "expand" the limited benefits 
provided for under the Act. Nor does he seek to toll receipt of the 
52 weeks of benefits until those benefits first are requested. 
Rather, Larsen simply seeks to receive exactly what the Act provides -
-52 weeks of specified benefits after he suffered a loss for which 
the Act provides compensation. 
In connection with Larsen's breach of good faith claim, that 
claim was dismissed based upon the trial court's improper dismissal of 
Larsen's claim for full benefits under the Act. That claim should be 
reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACT PR0VIDE8 FOR 52 WEEKS OF BENEPIT8 FOLLOWING THE DATE OF 
LOSS. 
The relevant provision of the Act that is at issue provides 
for payment to a claimant of 
1 
the lesser of $250 per week: or 85% of any loss of gross 
income and loss of earning capacity per person from 
inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks 
after the loss, except that this benefit need not be paid 
for the first three days of disability unless the disability 
continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the 
date of injury* 
Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i) (1987) (emphasis added). 
Allstate erroneously insists that the word "loss" as used in the Act 
really means Mdate of the accident," despite the same word's earlier 
use in the sentence as unambiguously referring to lost income and 
earning capacity. 
In Utah, as well as in other jurisdictions, courts apply the 
general rule of statutory construction that a word or phrase used 
multiple times within the same statute carries the same meaning 
throughout the statute. State v. Oehlerking. 709 P.2d 900, 902 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1985); Bishop v. Wood, 134 P.2d 180, 182 (Utah 1943) .* 
Applying this logical rule to section 31A-22-307(l)(b)(i), it becomes 
clear that "loss" as used in the Act refers to loss of income and 
earning lost resulting from a claimant's inability to work. 
II. PAYING BENEFITS AS THE LOSS 18 INCURRED WILL NOT IMPAIR THE ACT'S 
PURPOSE IN PROVIDING EFFICIENT AND LOW-COST INSURANCE PROTECTION. 
Allstate's contention that Mr. Larsen's interpretation of 
the Act's benefit provisions will complicate the Act by allowing 
potential recovery of wage loss benefits for an indefinite time after 
1
 In Bishop, the court declared that a term used more than 
once in the same statute has the same meaning, "unless a manifest 
difference requires a different meaning to be attached." Bishop, 
134 P.2d at 182. 
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of the injuries he suffered as a result ot the accident• 
III. COMMON SENSE AND REASON SUPPORT LARSEN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ACT. 
Allstate attempts to characterize the many bad IMSS i bill t 
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benefits provided under the Act Allstate now seeks to disadvantage 
3 
Larsen because of his efforts, apparently suggesting that Larsen 
simply should have accepted benefits under the Act immediately 
following the accident and not returned to work. This result flies in 
the face of reason and fairness. 
IV. GUIDELINES POR NO-FAPLT LEGISLATION SUPPORT IARgEN'8 
INTERPRETATION OP UTAH'B NO-FAULT ACT AS PROVIDING LOSS-OP-
INCOME BENEFITS WHEN THE CLAIMANT ACTUALLY SUFFERS THE LOSS 
OF WAGE OR INCOME. 
Contrary to Allstate's contentions, Mr. Larsen's 
interpretation of section 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i), which grants wage-loss 
benefits when the claimant can no longer work, rather than when the 
accident occurs, is consistent with a well-reasoned approach taken by 
leading legal scholars. 
For example, the Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 
formulating a model no-fault act recognized that benefits, both 
medical expenses and wage-loss, are to be calculated from the time of 
loss, not when the injury occurs. See Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident 
Reparations Act § 23(a) (1972). Other commentators have noted that 
the public policy behind no-fault insurance is to compensate accident 
victims for their out-of-pocket medical expenses and loss of earnings 
as such expenses accrue. George G. Couch, Couch on Insurance. 2d S 
45:661 (rev. ed. 1981). 
Furthermore, Allstate's application of the Utah Supreme 
Courtis narrow interpretation of the Act, taken in Jamison v. Utah 
Home Fire Insurance Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977), is inappropriate to 
the case at hand, since Mr- Larsen is not seeking to expand the 
4 
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 Allstate incorrectly con tends that the commencement of wage-
loss benefits when the loss of income occurs violates the purpose 
of the No-Fault Act. Utah Supreme Court has determined that the 
Act's objective is to control insurance costs. Jones v. 
Transamerica Insurance Co.. 592 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1979); Jamison 
v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co., 559 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah 1977). 
Here, Larsen has made every effort to avoid claiming wage-loss 
benefits by attempting to return to work after the accident. He 
filed his claim only after :i t was physically impossible for him to 
work. Allstate's interpretation of the Act, if accepted, would 
punish individuals such as Larsen and condem their work ethic by 
denying benefits rightly due resulting from income ] oss. 
! 
Granting Larsen wage loss benefits from the time of his loss 
conforms with guidelines for no-fault legislation set out by legal 
scholars, and is within the limitations imposed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in their interpretation of the Utah No-Fault Act. 
V. LARSEN'S BAD FAITH CLAIM SHOULD BE REINSTATED. 
Allstate contends that Larsen's bad faith claim properly was 
dismissed. It asserts two bases for its argument. First, Allstate 
argues that there existed "a fairly debatable reason for an insurer's 
conduct or decision." This is a fact-intensive inquiry, and it is 
undisputed that Larsen had no opportunity to conduct any discovery on 
this issue. The trial court dismissed Larsen's bad faith claim based 
on its errnoeous decision that Allstate properly had refused to pay 
Larsen 52 weeks of benefits under the Act. 
Allstate claims that its position on summary judgment was 
supported by the uncontroverted affidavit of its lawyer, who Allstate 
contends is an expert. Although the propriety of such an affidavit is 
questionable in that it results in Allstate's lawyer acting as a 
witness in the case, it demonstrates the fact-intensive nature of the 
relevant inquiry. It cannot be fairly concluded in this case in light 
of the complete absence of discovery that Allstate took a position in 
the trial court that was "fairly debatable.11 Furthermore, it should 
be noted that Allstate's attorney's affidavit is not "uncontested." 
In response, Larsen's attorney filed a proper Rule 56(f) affidavit 
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If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these 
expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1 1/2 percent 
per month after the due date. The person entitled to the 
benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the 
expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and 
interest, the insure is also required to pay reasonable 
attorney's fees to the claimant. 
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provide* compensation far All losses suffered by claimants, it is also 
not tended tn provide all remedies for wrongful actinnr suffered by 
c l a i m a n t s , I n i I 11 e j in 111 i *, i 111 i i t i11 IJ 1i M M I I I I « i i m i i n 11 mil in 11 w HI I I I I HI I 
" a c t i o n i n i n n t r a r t " a n d b a d f a i t h c l a i m s may a l s o h e marie p u r s u a n t 
t "> > i mnt r in t riai urn I n Beck v . Fa rmers I n s u r a n c e Exchange , 701 P,2d 
795 t'Utah 1 L I8 ! J | , Llie cou r t a l l owed an 11 -m ml In I i in 11 | Iiiiiill f m 11 h 
c o n t r a c t u a l c l a i m a g a i n s t h i s i n s u r e r for no- f a u l t i i e d i c a l and wage-
loss benefits owed in conjunction with a hit-and-run accident. "In an 
action for breach of a duty to bargain in good faith, a broad range of 
recoverable damages is conceivable, particularly given the unique 
nature and purpose of an insurance contract.11 Id. at 802. 
Accordingly, Mr. Larsen is free to pursue any valid 
contractual remedy, including the bad faith claim, beyond the minimal 
remedies of interest on overdue benefits and attorney's fees provided 
by section 31A-22-309(5). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgement in favor of Allstate, and order the trial court to enter 
judgement in favor of Mr. Larsen on his breach of contract claim 
against Allstate. It also should reinstate Larsen's bad faith claim 
against Allstate. 
Dated this ^^Siay of July, 1992. 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
By: 65XZZ&£><^ 
Brent O. Hatch 
Mark F. James 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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